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ABSTRACT
The importance of the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Janus
v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees
has been widely recognized for its effect on reducing the power and
influence of public unions. A close reading of the majority opinion
provides a clue that compulsory collective bargaining itself may be
settling into the court’s crosshairs. Collective bargaining is an important tool, by which labor can reduce the often-inherent power
imbalance it has with ownership and management. Yet as this
Article outlines, the interests of individual workers can often be at
odds with those other workers or even the union itself. When the law
designates a union as the exclusive bargaining agent for a group
of workers, it prohibits individual workers from advocating for
their own interests. As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in
Janus, this results in a substantial reduction of the rights of
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workers, particularly those who do not feel the union represents
their interests. This Article will explore the history of unions and
collective bargaining, the variety of worker rights that are affected
by compulsory collective bargaining, why the Supreme Court might
choose to eliminate compulsory collective bargaining via the First
Amendment, and what may ultimately replace it.
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INTRODUCTION
The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Janus1 was a
game changer. The central question presented to the Court was
whether public unions can charge non-members they nonetheless
represent in collective bargaining. The Court held that public unions cannot require non-members to pay fees, often called “agency
fees,” even for services the union provides. The Court then went
one step further and required that public employees must opt in
to union membership, rather than being automatically enrolled
as members and provided the opportunity to opt out.
Much attention has been paid to how the Janus decision
will deplete the ranks and coffers of public unions, diminishing
their political power, and hurting the Democratic Party, which
derives much of its support from public unions.2 Perhaps even
more interesting than the political impact of the Janus decision
however, is the effect of the Court’s holdings on the future of
mandatory collective bargaining itself. In many states, public unions are the sole bargaining agent for groups of employees, whether
those employees are union members or not.3 We believe that the
Janus decision may have a tremendous impact on this practice,
perhaps even culminating in the end of compulsory collective
bargaining altogether.
This Article will focus on collective bargaining within public
unions. Part I will briefly address the history and development
of labor unions and collective bargaining. Part II will discuss the
recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Janus. Finally, Part III will
use rhetorical methodologies to examine the likely effects (legal,
political, and economic) of the Janus decision’s reframing of the

Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct.
2448 (2018).
2 James Feigenbaum & Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, The Supreme Court
just dealt unions a big blow in Janus. Here’s what you need to know about the
political fallout, WASH. POST (June 27, 2018, 3:20 PM), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/06/27/the-supreme-court-just-dealt-un
ions-a-big-blow-in-janus-heres-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-political-fall
out/?utm_term=.7b31b07f59f6 [https://perma.cc/L32M-R9ZY]; Amanda Vinicky,
In Wake of Janus Decision, What’s Next for Public Unions, WTTW CHI. (July 2,
2018), https://news.wttw.com/2018/07/02/wake-janus-decision-what-s-next-public
-unions [https://perma.cc/4BW5-4ZWW].
3 ACLU, Collective Bargaining and Civil Liberties, https://www.aclu.org
/other/collective-bargaining-and-civil-liberties [https://perma.cc/U9DX-DZFW].
1
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First Amendment in the context of compulsory collective bargaining vis-à-vis public unions.
I.BRIEF UNION HISTORY: POWER IMBALANCES BETWEEN
LABOR AND MANAGEMENT CREATED LOW WAGES AND
POOR WORKING CONDITIONS
In the late nineteenth century, there existed a massive
power imbalance between employers and employees.4 Employers,
particularly large companies like Standard Oil, Carnegie Steel,
and others were worth vast sums of money. John D. Rockefeller,
Jr. became the world’s first billionaire in 1916, controlling a sum
worth close to $30 billion today.5 An even more telling measure
of his power is that when Rockefeller died in 1937, his assets
equaled 1.5 percent of America’s total economic output, a feat that
would require about $340 billion today.6 While Rockefeller and
his Standard Oil Empire represented the most extreme example
at the time, other titans of industry such as Andrew Carnegie
and Carnegie Steel (later U.S. Steel), Cornelius Vanderbilt and
his railroad empire, J.P. Morgan and his financial and business
empire, and others controlled vast swaths of American business.7
The average worker could be overworked, underpaid, and forced
to endure horrible working conditions, without recourse.8
Working conditions in the late nineteenth century and early
twentieth century were frequently abysmal.9 Authors like Upton
Sinclair,10 Charles Dickens,11 John Steinbeck,12 George Orwell,13


G. William Domhoff, The Rise and Fall of Labor Unions In The U.S.,
WHO RULES AMERICA?, https://whorulesamerica.ucsc.edu/power/history_of_la
bor_unions.html [https://perma.cc/BU97-D5YV].
5 Carl O’Donnell, The Rockefellers: The Legacy of History’s Richest Man,
FORBES (July 11, 2014, 11:52 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/carlodonnell
/2014/07/11/the-rockefellers-the-legacy-of-historys-richest-man/#5e4410ca3c26
[https://perma.cc/KT4M-SBHG].
6 Id.
7 DIANE TELGEN, DEFINING MOMENTS THE GILDED AGE 45 (2012).
8 Working Conditions in the Industrial Revolution, HISTORY CRUNCH, https://
www.historycrunch.com/working-conditions-in-the-industrial-revolution.html#/
[https://perma.cc/AG9E-8RNR].
9 Id.
10 UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906).
11 CHARLES DICKENS, HARD TIMES (1854).
12 JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH (James Lloyd, ed., 1939).
13 GEORGE ORWELL, THE ROAD TO WIGAN PIER (Victor Gollancz, ed., 1937).
4
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and countless others documented issues with workplace safety,
cleanliness, long working hours, and other horrifying issues
workers faced.14 Incidents like the strike and ensuing violence at
Carnegie Steel’s Homestead plant also raised public awareness
about the poor working conditions many people faced.15 From this
precarious economic moment, the modern American labor movement began togain strength.
As the power of labor unions and workers grew, working
conditions and inequities in compensation started to be addressed.16
A variety of laws were passed during the twentieth century, which
substantially enhanced the rights and working conditions for
workers. These are a few examples:
• The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), initially
passed in 1938, limited the number of hours children
under 16 could work in non-agricultural positions, prohibited the hiring of those under 18 for certain highrisk jobs, and established a federal minimum wage.17
• The Equal Pay Act of 1963 prohibits sex-based wage
discrimination between men and women working for
the same employer and performing substantially similar jobs.18
• Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made it illegal
for businesses to discriminate based on “race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.”19
• The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
prohibits discrimination against workers 40 years of
age or older.20


14 Joe Sommerlad, Karl Marx at 200: Ten Left-Wing Writers Who Followed
in the Footsteps of a Giant, INDEPENDENT (May 4, 2018, 3:31 PM), https://
www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/features/karl-marx-200
-years-anniversary-left-wing-novelists-george-orwell-hg-wells-john-steinbeck
-a8333991.html [https://perma.cc/9NWG-CNDF].
15 ARTHUR BURGOYNE, THE HOMESTEAD STRIKE OF 1892 (1979).
16 Domhoff, supra note 4.
17 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012).
18 Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963). See also Equal
Pay Act of 1963 and Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/brochure-equal
_pay_and_ledbetter_act.cfm [https://perma.cc/Y8A8-3FCR] [hereinafter EEOC].
19 Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2000e-17 (1964).
20 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–
624 (2012).
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• The Occupational Safety and Health Act established
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) in 1970.21 OSHA assures “safe and healthy
working conditions for working men and women by
setting and enforcing standards and by providing
training, outreach, education and assistance.”22 Since
its passage, Congress has expanded OSHA’s whistleblower authority 22 times to protect workers from
discrimination.23
• The Americans with Disabilities Act, passed in 1990,
provides broad protections against employment discrimination for those with qualified disabilities.24
• The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 provides
eligible employees with up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave
per year to deal with the birth of a child, an adoption,
or a personal or family member’s medical condition.25
• The Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 prohibits wage
discrimination against women and minorities. It was
passed to overturn the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision
in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc.,
550 U.S. 618 (2007), which severely restricted the
time period for filing complaints of employment discrimination concerning compensation.26 Under the
Ledbetter Act, each paycheck that contains discriminatory compensation is a separate violation regardless of when the discrimination began.27
A tremendous amount of thought and effort have gone into
enacting laws that make workplaces safe and prohibit employers
from treating their employees unfairly.28 There is no doubt that

Reflections on OSHA’s History, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Jan. 2009), https://
www.osha.gov/history/OSHA_HISTORY_3360s.pdf [http://perma.cc/8X2L-NM8J].
22 About OSHA, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.osha.gov/aboutosha,
[https://perma.cc/9T5V-RHVU].
23 The Whistleblower Protection Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://
www.whistleblowers.gov/ [https://perma.cc/WY8Z-D6UT].
24 Americans with Disabilities Act, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www
.dol.gov/general/topic/disability/ada [https://perma.cc/73F4-L37Q].
25 The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611–2654 (2012).
26 EEOC, supra note 18.
27 Id.
28 See generally id.
21
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labor unions have played an important historical role in bringing about those changes. One of the most important tools unions
have used is the power of collective action.29
A.The Rise of Unions and Development of Collective Bargaining
While employers have historically enjoyed a power imbalance
vis-à-vis individual employees, that is not necessarily the case when
the employees work together.30 Even employers inclined to abuse
or mistreat individual employees are forced to think twice if by
doing so they might alienate their entire workforce and risk a strike
or walkout.31 Labor unions and the collective bargaining process
were introduced in an attempt to increase the bargaining power
of workers, better their working conditions, and increase their
compensation.32 Individual workers had almost no ability to negotiate with massive companies and were easily replaceable.33
They banded together and formed unions, largely so they could
institute the practice of collective bargaining and negotiate their
compensation, benefits, working conditions, and other conditions
of employment as a group.34 When a company’s entire workforce,
or the workers in a particular industry, joined forces, they acquired much more power.35 Unions could wield enormous power,
mostly through the threat that the entire workforce would walk
out or strike and shut down a company’s business.36 The union
would negotiate on behalf of all the workers through collective
bargaining.37 This helped to end or at least mitigate the so-called
“race to the bottom,” where management could choose to employ
the individual workers willing to endure the worst working conditions and receive the least amount of compensation.38


ACLU, supra note 3.
Aditi Bagchi, Note, The Myth Of Equality In The Employment Relation,
2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 579, 583–85 (2009).
31 Id. at 625.
32 Id. at 614–15.
33 See JOHN P. FREY, CRAFT UNIONS OF ANCIENT AND MODERN TIMES 70–71
(1945).
34 See id.
35 See id.
36 See id.
37 See id.
38 See id.
29
30
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The power of unions has declined as their membership has
declined, both in raw numbers and as a percentage of the population.39 The number of employed union members has declined by
2.9 million since 1983.40 During the same time, the number of all
wage and salary workers grew from 88.3 million to 133.7 million.41
“Consequently, the union membership rate was 20.1 percent in
1983 and declined to 11.1 percent in 2015.”42 This drop in union
membership has been felt far more sharply in the private sector
than in the public sector.43 “In 2015, public-sector workers had a
union membership rate of 35.2 percent, more than five times
higher than that of private sector workers (6.7 percent).”44 “While
the unionization rate for the public sector has remained relatively
steady over time, the rate for the private sector has declined from
16.8 percent in 1983 to 6.7 percent in 2015.”45
“Today, the United States has three distinct regimes of
collective bargaining: one for the railroad and airline industries,
one for the rest of the private sector, and one for the public sector.”46
This Article focuses on collective bargaining within public unions.
The public sector regime is really fifty-one distinct systems, representing the federal system and then fifty different state systems.47
Currently, thirty-one states permit collective bargaining for public employees to some level, while nineteen states prohibit the
practice.48 In states that permit collective bargaining, unions certified by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) serve as the
exclusive bargaining agent for groups of employees.49


See Megan Dunn & James Walker, Union Membership in the United States,
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATS. (Sept. 2016), https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2016
/union-membership-in-the-united-states/pdf/union-membership-in-the-united
-states.pdf [http://perma.cc/LQ3X-7Q5N].
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 See id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Lance A Compa, An Overview of Collective Bargaining in the United States,
CORNELL UNIVERSITY ILR SCHOOL DIGITAL COMMONS (2014), https://digital
commons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1925&context=articles [https://
perma.cc/UX23-6K85].
47 Id.
48 See id. (citing Shimabukuro, infra note 50).
49 See id.
39
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In states that permit public unions to negotiate on behalf
of public employees, those unions are required to represent all of
the public employees within a bargaining unit, even those who
choose not to join the union.50 This creates what is commonly
called a “free rider problem,” where public employees who derive
the benefits of collective bargaining contribute nothing to the
union.51 Many employees who choose not to join the union base
their decisions on objections to positions those unions take and
activities in which they engage.52 Over time, a sort of uneasy
compromise was reached, whereby those who chose not to join
the union would not have to pay dues—nor support political advocacy by the union—but would be required to pay agency fees.53
Those agency fees were attempts to measure the fair value of the
benefits non-members of the union nonetheless derived from the
union’s activities, such as collective bargaining.54 The non-member
would not be required to support union activities or positions she
disagreed with, and the unions would not be required to provide
the benefit of its services to non-members for free.55
B.The Elephant (and Donkey) in the Room: Public Unions Play
a Major Role in Politics
Public unions play a major role in local, state, and national
politics, operating as “political machines.”56 Public unions have

See Jon O. Shimabukuro, Congressional Research Service: Collective Bargaining and Employees in the Public Sector, CONG. RES. SERV. (Mar. 30, 2011),
https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www
.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=2241&context=key_workplace [https://perma
.cc/G425-39XN].
51 See Andrew Hanna & Caitlin Emma, Supreme Court Could Cripple Public
Unions in Run-up to 2018 Midterms, POLITICO (Feb. 25, 2018), https://www
.politico.com/story/2018/02/25/supreme-court-public-unions-2018-midterms-423
436 [https://perma.cc/E4RP-ACKF].
52 See id.
53 See David Greene & Nina Totenberg, Transcript, Supreme Court Rules
Against Mandatory Union Dues for Public Employees, NPR (June 27, 2018, 11:19
AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/27/623851752/supreme-court-rules-against
-mandatory-union-dues-for-public-employees [https://perma.cc/SL7B-Y4TV].
54 See id.
55 See id.
56 Horacio A. Larreguy, Cesar E. Montiel Olea & Pablo Querubin, The Role of
Labor Unions as Political Machines: Evidence from the Case of the Mexican
50
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deep coffers of money and a ready group of members and supporters they can mobilize to support or oppose a party, candidate,
or issue.57 The American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) and its affiliates spent $26 million on
the 2016 election cycle, according to federal election records, virtually all of which was spent trying to elect Democrats.58 If spending
by the National Education Association, the American Federation
of Teachers, and the Service Employees International Union are
added, the total for the 2016 cycle rises to about $166 million,
still almost exclusively deployed to help Democratic candidates
and causes.59 An analysis of the spending by federal public employee unions reveals that some of these unions, including The
American Federation of Government Employees, National Treasury Employees Union, National Association of Postal Supervisors,
and National Postal Mail Handlers Union, made in excess of 90
percent of their political contributions to Democratic causes and
candidates.60 This pattern of spending has earned public unions
favor and influence from Democrats and enmity from Republicans.61 A Congressional Research Service report from 2014 estimated that depriving public unions of agency fees would reduce
that figure to closer to $55 million, a difference of approximately
$111 million for a single election cycle.62
One long-standing criticism of public unions is the apparent
conflict of interest in having those unions negotiate the terms of a
labor agreement with political leaders they may have helped to elect

Teachers’ Union, INST. FOR QUANTITATIVE SOC. SCI., HARV. UNIV., at 2 (Aug. 2013),
http://www.iq.harvard.edu/files/iqss/files/updated_march_6_paper.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/ETZ5-UA3Z].
57 See id.
58 Hanna & Emma, supra note 51.
59 Id.
60 Ralph R. Smith, Tallying Political Donations from Federal Employees
and Unions, FEDSMITH (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.fedsmith.com/2016/12/21
/tallying-political-donations-from-federal-employees-and-unions/ [https://perma
.cc/2RCB-TW49].
61 See AP: Brown’s Appointments Favor Democrats, CBS SACRAMENTO
(Aug. 28, 2011), https://sacramento.cbslocal.com/2011/08/28/ap-browns-appoint
ments-favor-democrats/ [https://perma.cc/94TL-XR24].
62 Hanna & Emma, supra note 51 (citing Benjamin Collins, Right to Work
Laws: Legislative Background and Empirical Research, CONG. RES. SERV. (Jan. 6,
2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42575.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6LW-99GP]).
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and who may be counting on their support in the next campaign.63
While private unions negotiate for a larger share of the profits of
a business, public unions negotiate for more tax money.64 If public
workers strike, they strike against the taxpayers.65 This is a notion
that even President Franklin D. Roosevelt found “unthinkable
and intolerable.”66 “The public-employee representatives are paid
by the unions, and thus beholden to them, while the politicians
across the table are also beholden to unions, for their campaign
contributions or votes. The interests of the average nonunion
American, the public, are not represented.”67
These are facts, numbers, and arguments that both parties are acutely aware of.68 Democrats have fought to strengthen
the influence of public unions, while Republicans have sought to
diminish them.69 Research comparing the political effects of rightto-work legislation on counties straddling a state line where one
county is affected by the legislation and the other is not show
the profound effects of such legislation.70 When Republicans
have been successful in passing right-to-work laws, the power of
unions has been reduced and Democratic candidates have suffered.71 In presidential elections, for example, such right-to-work
laws have cost Democratic candidates an estimated two to five
percentage points.72 That margin is more than that by which


See James Sherk, F.D.R. Warned Us About Public Unions, N.Y. TIMES
(July 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/02/18/the-first
-blow-against-public-employees/fdr-warned-us-about-public-sector-unions [https://
perma.cc/6YS9-WRBB].
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Amity Shlaes, The Great Public Union Divide, STAR TRIBUNE (Dec. 26,
2012, 8:30 PM), http://www.startribune.com/the-great-public-union-divide/18
4858651 [https://perma.cc/3E8H-ZJ54].
68 See generally James Feigenbaum, Alexander Hertel-Fernandez & Vanessa
Williamson, Right-to-Work Laws Have Devastated Unions—and Democrats,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/08/opinion/conor
-lamb-unions-pennsylvania.html [https://perma.cc/592L-HYWR].
69 See generally Sean McElwee, How the Right’s War on Unions Is Killing
the Democratic Party, THE NATION (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.thenation.com
/article/right-to-work-laws-are-killing-democrats-at-the-ballot-box/ [https://perma
.cc/8ZWP-ER5V].
70 See Feigenbaum et al., supra note 68; see also McElwee, supra note 69.
71 Feigenbaum et al., supra note 68.
72 Id.
63
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Donald Trump prevailed over Hillary Clinton in Michigan and
Wisconsin in 2016.73 One hotly contested political battleground
has been over whether public unions should be allowed to charge
agency fees to non-members for the costs of collective bargaining.74
Unsurprisingly, agency fees are far more common in so-called
“blue states,” traditionally controlled by Democrats who are more
supportive of and reliant on unions.75 The battle over the degree
of compulsion unions can exert over non-members often reaches the
courts, where the contours of that battle can be traced through a
series of judicial decisions.
C.The Road from Abood to Janus
In 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court was asked in Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education to find a workable solution that balanced the interests of the non-union workers and the unions.76
The rule that emerged from Abood and the line of cases that
followed (“the Abood Rule”) stated that unions could not compel
workers to join nor pay for their “political and other ideological
activities,” but they could charge those workers fees for the efforts
the unions expended in collective bargaining on their behalf.77
While the Abood Court readily conceded that this was a form of
compelled speech, its narrow ruling attempted to navigate two complications.78 First, the fact (conceded by the Court) that economic
issues for public sector employees are always necessarily “political” (because they involve public tax dollars) and thus trigger
First Amendment protections; second, the governmental interest in
maintaining “peace” in industrial economic relations via collective bargaining’s implementation of a single representative body

See id.
See Robert Iafolla, Some U.S. States Embrace Pro-Union Laws, with Key
Fees Imperiled, REUTERS (June 27, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa
-court-unions-states/some-u-s-states-embrace-pro-union-laws-with-key-fees-im
periled-idUSKBN1JN2F4 [https://perma.cc/S3U3-JLA3].
75 See id.; see also Alexander Russo, Maps: Where The 21 “Agency Fee” States
Are—For Now, SCHOLASTIC (Sept. 28, 2015), https://scholasticadministrator.type
pad.com/thisweekineducation/2015/09/maps-where-the-21-agency-fee-states
-are-for-now.html#.XP8otohKjIV [https://perma.cc/VH6F-2M8N].
76 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 211 (1977).
77 Id. at 209, 235–36.
78 See id. at 235–36.
73
74
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to advocate for diverse populations of employees.79 Ultimately—
and ever since Abood—compulsory agency fees were held to survive the scrutiny of a First Amendment violation because, while
they were a form of “compelled speech,” they served the state’s
compelling interest in preventing disruptions of the “peace” in labor
and industrial relations.80
The Abood decision lasted for forty-one years: from the economic malaise of the 1970s, through the decline of American industry in the 1980s, and up to the height of the “disrupted” digital
economy of the early twenty-first century.81 In that time, twentytwo states enacted laws permitting unions and public employers
to take agency fees from a worker’s paycheck without his or her
consent.82 However, unions were required to separate their political or advocacy activities from collective bargaining activities.83
As the Court repeatedly ruled: they could charge non-union
members agency fees for the latter but could in no way require
workers to support the former.84 In 2018, the Janus decision
ended this practice by overturning Abood.85
II.JANUS: ARGUMENTS, RULING, & IMMEDIATE REACTION
Mark Janus was a child support specialist from the State
of Illinois.86 He was represented for the purpose of collective
bargaining by the American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees, Council 31 (AFSCME).87 Mr. Janus objected to a number of the union’s political positions and activities—specifically, that AFSCME’s “behavior in bargaining does
not appreciate the current fiscal crises in Illinois and does not

See id. at 219, 224–25, 228.
See id. at 236.
81 See Moshe Marvit, The Legal Arguments of Janus v. AFSCME Explained,
CENTURY FOUND. (Feb. 15, 2018), https://tcf.org/content/commentary/legal-argu
ments-janus-v-afscme-explained/?session=1&agreed=1 [https://perma.cc/N4
9P-RXA2].
82 See id.
83 See id.
84 See Abood, 431 U.S. at 222–23.
85 See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S.
Ct. 2448, 2456 (2018).
86 Id. at 2461.
87 Id.
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reflect his best interests or the interests of Illinois citizens”—and
chose not to join the union.88 Under the Abood Rule, Mr. Janus was
nonetheless charged a fee of $23.48 per pay period (an “agency
fee”), which could be used to fund the union’s legally required
mandate to represent all employees in collective bargaining, but
not “political or ideological” views.89 Mr. Janus’s agency fee represented 78 percent of a union-member’s dues.90 He challenged
this “agency fee”—and thus the Abood rule—by claiming that
financial support for the union (via money withheld from his wages)
violated his Constitutional right (as a government employee) to
free political speech.91
Overturning Abood, the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately
sided with Mr. Janus.92 First, it held that the State’s extraction
of agency fees from non-consenting public employees violated
the First Amendment because “no reliance interest [on agency
fees] on the part of public sector unions are sufficient to justify
the perpetuation of the free speech violations that Abood has
countenanced for the past 41 years.”93 Second, following their
decision in Knox v. Service Employees (2012), the Court held that
no form of payment to a public sector union may be deducted or
collected unless the employee affirmatively consents to pay.94
Understanding the history of these legal debates—and the exact
standard that the Court applies to “compelled” speech for government employees—is key to understanding how the Janus
decision’s conceptualization of the First Amendment could have
larger consequences for the future of collective bargaining.95
To start, it must be understood that there is nothing legally
novel about Mr. Janus’s First Amendment claim, or the Janus
decision recognizing that “agency fees” are a violation of a non-union
employee’s right to free political expression.96 In fact, the entire
Abood line of precedent on these agency fee cases presumes that

Id.
See Marvit, supra note 81.
90 Id.
91 See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2462.
92 See id. at 2486.
93 Id. at 2460.
94 See id. at 2486.
95 See id. at 2464–65.
96 See id.
88
89

624 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:609
the First Amendment rights of non-union workers are being violated through the government’s administration and funding of
collective bargaining, but allow this free speech violation because it serves a compelling state interest in the maintenance of
“labor peace.”97
Instead, what lies at the legal heart of Janus (and Abood)
is a more practical question of economics and legislative implementation. If the AFSCME is legally required to collectively
bargain and negotiate for all employees—whether they choose to
join the union or not—at what point do free-riders (like Mr. Janus)
make it financially impossible for the unions to carry out their
legal duty? Should workers, like Mr. Janus, be required (despite
clear First Amendment objections) to pay their fair share?
As Justice Kagan explained in her Janus dissent, the
free-rider problem—and its potentially existential consequences
for unions—is “basic economy theory.”98 If workers will benefit
from the union’s collective bargaining regardless of whether they
choose to pay for it, there is, obviously, a diminished incentive to
pay.99 (Which only matters, constitutionally, because the union
itself may become defunded to the point that it cannot conduct
effective collective bargaining for all employees). The First
Amendment question is thus fairly narrow: does the governmental interest in maintaining “peaceful” labor relations—via collective bargaining with a union—justify violating a non-union
member’s free speech rights in the collection of agency fees? In
the cases preceding Janus, the Court concluded that the freerider problem outweighed the Constitutional violation of public
sector employee rights.100 Or—to be more precise on this critical
point—the Court deferred to Congress and state legislatures on
the question of whether collective bargaining was key to peaceful labor relations and simply recognized that this was a compelling enough state interest to survive judicial scrutiny. In Janus,
the Court implemented a new standard of First Amendment
scrutiny without explicitly saying what exactly this new level of
heightened judicial scrutiny would be.101 After hypothetically

See id.
Id. at 2490 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
99 Id.
100 See id. at 2489.
101 See id. at 2465.
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applying exacting and strict scrutiny, the Court only concluded that
agency fees did not pass even the more “permissive” of tests.102
After Janus, all that is known is that agency fees are constitutionally protected political speech that cannot be violated by merely
demonstrating that “a government employer could reasonably
believe that the exaction of agency fees serves its interests.”103
The effects of the Janus holdings are likely far-reaching.
As the arguments from the AFSCME (and the press prognostications before and after Janus) attest, the removal of agency fees will
likely reduce the funds available to public sector unions, which
may then reduce those unions’ efficacy in collective bargaining, and
(because the issues of politics and economics are always intertwined
with labor issues) may sap unions of their political influence.104 This
process has already started, with the American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) and the Service
Employees International Union (SEIU) losing ninety-eight percent and ninety-four percent of their agency fee-paying members
respectively in the year following the Janus decision.105
As a practical matter, since many legislative bodies mandate collective bargaining as a management strategy to maintain
“labor peace” (i.e., they prefer to negotiate with a single union
rather than individual employees or competing unions), logistical
and accounting proposals to circumvent the Janus ruling have

Id.
Id.
104 For instance, see A Bogus Free Speech Argument at the Supreme Court
is Union Busting in the Name of the 1st Amendment, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 27,
2018), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-scotus-unions-201802
27-story.html [https://perma.cc/6GBK-HDWE]; Garret Epps, The Bogus Free
Speech Argument Against Unions, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 14, 2018), https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/the-bogus-free-speech-argument
-against-unions/553205/ [https://perma.cc/2JDQ-DKZ6]; Eric Levitz, Democrats Paid a Huge Price for Letting Unions Die, N.Y. INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 26,
2018),
http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/01/democrats-paid-a-huge-price-for
-letting-unions-die.html [https://perma.cc/96AX-LB9P]; Adam Liptak, Supreme
Court Ruling Delivers a Sharp Blow to Unions, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/politics/supreme-court-unions-orga
nized-labor.html [https://perma.cc/B7LE-X6PX].
105 Eric Boehm, After the Supreme Court Said Unions Can’t Force NonMembers to Pay Dues, Almost All of Them Stopped, REASON MAGAZINE (Apr. 9,
2019), https://reason.com/2019/04/09/janus-211000-workers-fled-seiu-afscme/
[https://perma.cc/G4JE-8FKJ] (citing filings with the U.S. Dep’t of Labor).
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already emerged from legal academics.106 For instance, Eugene
Volokh argues that rather than forcing employees to pay unions,
states could simply reduce employee salaries and then pay that
money to the unions directly.107 Benjamin Sachs argues that the
fact that “agency fees” pass through the hands of employees at
all—rather than being paid directly from the state to the unions—
makes this First Amendment quagmire a mere accounting issue.108
While these predictions on the political and policy implications of Janus are intriguing, a significantly more interesting—and
potentially revolutionary—part of the Janus decision has received
scant attention: how the Court views collective bargaining in
relation to free speech and the consequences of this view for how
the First Amendment is applied to governmental employees. We
believe that the current U.S. Supreme Court is moving toward
holding that the act of negotiating with one’s employer is a protected form of expression. To better see the Constitutional implication of this reframing—and the arguments that the Supreme
Court is likely to rely on to make labor negotiations a form of
protected political speech in the public sector—we turn to the
rhetorical dimensions of Janus to analyze the potential consequences (legal, political, and economic) of the decision.
III.THE FIRST AMENDMENT ROAD FROM JANUS TO THE
ELIMINATION OF COMPULSORY COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING: A RHETORICAL ANALYSIS
While the right to economic self-expression in employee
negotiation may seem like “common sense,” the legal fact is that
applying First Amendment protections to employees’ economic
speech in the public sector is not straightforward. A bit of dicta
from Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Janus makes the connections between individual liberty and labor negotiation clear:

See Eugene Volokh & Mark Janus, The Limited Effects of the Supreme
Court’s Janus Decision, The Volokh Conspiracy, REASON MAGAZINE (June 27,
2018), https://reason.com/2018/06/27/the-limited-effects-of-the-supreme-court
[https://perma.cc/7TYV-S94B].
107 Id.
108 Benjamin I. Sachs, Agency Fees and the First Amendment (Harv. Public
Law, Working Paper No. 17-48, Sept. 22, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3041341 [https://perma.cc/B3B6-6DGJ].
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Designating a union as the employees’ exclusive representative substantially restricts the rights of individual employees.
Among other things, this designation means that individual
employees may not be represented by any agent other than
the designated union; nor may individual employees negotiate
directly with their employer.109

The right to negotiate is closely intertwined with the right
to contract.110 If workers have the right to sell their time and
skills to an employer, then they likewise have the right to bargain for the most favorable possible terms for that exchange.
Historically, some liberals and union advocates have maintained
that an individual right of contract weakened the power of labor
and unions, to the detriment of workers generally.111 Roscoe Pound,
the former Dean of Harvard Law School railed against:
The currency in juristic thought of an individualist conception
of justice, which exaggerates the importance of property and
of contract, exaggerates private right at the expense of public
right, and is hostile to legislation, taking a minimum of lawmaking to be the ideal.112

The current conservative majority on the U.S. Supreme
Court, led in this case by Justice Alito, seemed to take a different
view.113 The Court seemed inclined to revive the doctrine of economic substantive due process associated with the Lochner era.114
In Allgeyer v. Louisiana, the Court unanimously held that:
[T]he right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his
faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and
work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation; and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a successful
conclusion the purposes above mentioned.115


Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct.
2448, 2460 (2018).
110 See Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 454 (1909).
111 See id. at 470.
112 Id. at 457.
113 See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2484.
114 See id. at 2479.
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The Allgeyer decision was based on reading the word liberty in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
include a liberty of contract.116 It is possible but unlikely that
the Supreme Court will simply revive this way of thinking.
There are significant divisions on the Court with respect to the
very concept of substantive due process.117 The same conservative Justices who are likely to be sympathetic to strengthening
the individual right to contract have often been critical of their
liberal colleagues using substantive due process to achieve their
desired results.118 Rather than risk charges of hypocrisy on that
issue, it seems more likely that Court’s conservative majority
will approach this issue as one implicating the First Amendment
rather than the Fourteenth.
While there may be a Due Process right inherent to labor
negotiation, it must be remembered that the Janus opinion—
beyond Alito’s dicta—does not rule on that novel question, but
rather the issue of First Amendment protections.119 Which means
if Justice Alito is to successfully hold his coalition of five votes
from Janus together and continue to chip away at compulsory
collective bargaining, a more persuasive argument will have to be
constructed to explain how exclusive representation “substantially restricts the rights of individual employees” in the context
of the Court’s free speech precedents.
We believe the Janus decision is likely to be followed by a
series of decisions, made over the course of years, which gradually
limit the practice of compulsory collective bargaining in the name
of a First Amendment right to negotiation. Given the complexities
of this paradigm (which only applies to the narrow case of governmental employees, but could be understood more broadly as an
affirmation of free speech rights for all public and private workers),
what follows are a variety of principles—legal and rhetorical—
the Court is likely to rely on for such an effort and some of their
possible consequences for both the shaping of public workers’
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understanding of free speech and the nature of “labor peace” in
the post-digital era of economic and political disruption.
A.Principle One: Negotiation Is Protected Expression
Negotiation is a discussion with another, aimed at reaching
an agreement.120 It is logically—and in the public imagination—
a form of inherently expressive conduct, where a party advocates
for his needs or interests. In a 2008 case from Seattle that
struck down a rule aimed at limiting housing discrimination, the
King County Superior Court described negotiation as a “valuable
speech activit[y]” that trumps other governmental interests.121 Forcing someone—through mandated collective bargaining—to acquiesce to a negotiating position she disagrees with (or to remain
silent while someone purportedly advocating for her takes a
position with which she disagrees) is, as the Court has long understood, constitutionally problematic. Additionally, as Janus
makes clear, wage negotiations between a public worker’s union
and a governmental entity involve how much the public will be
required to pay (via taxes), making these conversations inherently a matter of public political concern.122
For many Americans, particularly those of a libertarian
bent, these principles seem straightforward: labor negotiations
with governmental entities are an important form of economic
speech, deserving of the same First Amendment protections as
other political discourse.123 But in the context of government
employees and public workers, First Amendment claims always
trigger other complications. While the First Amendment, extended
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the
federal government from abridging the freedom of speech, employees that are truly in the private sector, by definition, have no
First Amendment protections.124 But while the federal government

Negotiation, OXFORD ADVANCED LEARNER’S DICTIONARY, https://www
.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/negotiation?q=negotiation
[https://perma.cc/5W3J-2UU4].
121 Yim v. City of Seattle, No. 17-2-05595-6 SEA, 2018 WL 10140201, at *5 (Wash.
Super., King County Mar. 28, 2018) (emphasis added).
122 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2474.
123 See Volokh & Janus, supra note 106.
124 See U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV.
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cannot generally prohibit an individual from expressing his beliefs, the corollary to that proposition is found in the Compelled
Speech Doctrine, which prohibits the government from requiring
a person or organization to engage in speech or expression they
disagree with or find objectionable except when the government
proves that the compelled speech acts “are narrowly tailored to a
compelling state purpose.”125
In considering how—via Janus—future courts could attempt
to extend free speech protection to negotiation, three legal and
policy questions then emerge: (1) what constitutes the outside
parameters of “employee speech” (in a public workplace) that are
deserving of First Amendment protections; (2) does negotiation
(as a free speech right for governmental employees) always outweigh the compelling state interest in promoting labor peace; and
(3) what is the connection between government employees’ First
Amendment rights and management’s ability to maintain stable
relations within its workforce?
Questions (1) and (2) are ultimately issues of communication
with potentially far-reaching consequences for the management
(and information management) of governmental workers. As Justice Kagan’s dissent in Janus makes clear, “The Court’s decisions
have long made plain that government entities have substantial
latitude to regulate their employees’ speech—especially about
terms of employment—in the interest of operating their workplaces effectively.”126 What becomes complicated after Janus is
that by equating Mr. Janus’s withheld wages (via agency fees) with
protected public speech, the distinction between government
employees speaking “as citizen[s] on matters of public concern”
(which was often protected) and employees speaking on issues of
“merely private employment matters” (which was often unprotected) collapses.127 Instead of examining the specific content of
a government employee’s speech, Kagan argues, the Court’s preJanus focus was historically a rhetorical analysis of the communicative audience an employee was trying to reach: “whether the
speech was truly of the workplace—addressed to it, made in it

Andrew Jensen, Compelled Speech, Expressive Conduct, and Wedding
Cakes: A Commentary on Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 13 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 147, 150 (2018).
126 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 2495 (citations omitted).
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and (most of all) about it.”128 Anticipating the (potentially enormous) First Amendment complications that would arise from
reading Janus as constitutionally equating all governmental
employee speech about labor issues as political matters of “public concern,” Kagan writes:
But arguing about the terms of employment is still arguing
about the terms of employment: The workplace remains both
the context and the subject matter of the expression. If all that
speech really counted as “of public concern,” as the majority suggest, the mass of public employee’s complaints (about pay and
benefits and workplace policy and such) would become ‘federal
constitutional issue[s].... And contrary to decades’ worth of
precedent, government employers would then have far less
control over their workforces than private employers do.129

While Supreme Court opinions are notoriously impenetrable
for laypeople—and ignorance of the law is never an excuse—
Janus’s “labor peace” standard opens up a unique legal (and
rhetorical) relationship between workers’ understanding of their
free speech rights and First Amendment precedent.130 Supreme
Court cases do not—as decades of research in legal rhetoric have
demonstrated—occur in a vacuum.131 As the final, and most
public and publicized arbiter of rights, Supreme Court opinions
do not merely control legal doctrine but also, rhetorically, create
and shape the civic fabric of what citizens perceive to be their
Constitutional rights.132 (Creating what communication theorist
Gerald Hauser calls the “vernacular” public understanding of
Constitutional protections.133) Already, in recent years, First
Amendment rulings (even beyond public union cases) have woven
a new regime—in the public imagination—of what constitutes
one’s free speech rights vis-à-vis their capital, taxes, and labor.134


Id.
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& Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1996).
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What has been underreported about the Janus decision, however,
is that by equating a government employee’s taxpayer-funded
wages with free speech (i.e., equating money with ideological
expression), the Court has eroded the firewall distinction between labor (e.g., what one “does” at work) and politics (e.g., how
we debate and argue about what a governmental employee does,
or does not do, at work).
While a seemingly esoteric point—and also, ironically, a
fairly purebred Marxist interpretation of the symbolically political
nature of all labor—the practical (i.e., management) consequences
of collapsing the difference between what is a “workplace” issue
and what is a “public concern” could have significant legal consequences for continuing to apply Janus’s First Amendment standard to employee labor issues.135 If, to meet the Janus test, the
Court has to weigh the compelling state interest in promoting
“peaceful” labor relations and “industrial” labor stability, what
happens when everything a governmental employee does (or says
or is paid) at work becomes a matter of protected political free
speech?136 In the 2006 Garcetti case, Justice Kennedy already
predicted the practical consequences (for governmental managers
and the courts) of extending Janus-esque First Amendment protections to public sector workers, arguing that it would “commit state
and federal courts to a new, permanent, and intrusive role, mandating judicial oversight of communications between and among
government employees and their superiors in the course of official business.”137 Such a “displacement of managerial discretion
by judicial supervision finds no support in our precedents.”138
An absurd—but legally logical—hypothetical outlines the potential future contours of Janus’s free speech paradigm and its
consequences for smooth labor relations: a worker, caught in the
2018–2019 government shutdown, could argue that his First
Amendment rights were violated because he and his coworkers

statement, a wedding endorsement in his own voice and of his own creation,
has a significant First Amendment speech component and implicates his deep
and sincere religious beliefs.” Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1721 (2018); see also Nat. Inst. of Family & Life
Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368, 2378 (2018); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n
of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988).
135 See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2491 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
136 Id. at 2488 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
137 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 411 (2006).
138 Id. at 423.
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were not being paid.139 Just as Mr. Janus’s case ultimately rested
on his pre-paycheck wages being legally funneled to the AFCME
(which constitutes “political speech” because it involves the public
debate over the distribution of tax dollars) our “Shutdown Worker’s”
pre-paycheck wages are withheld (entirely) because of a management decision to suspend the federal government for budgetary
negotiation purposes.140 In both cases, wages and labor are construed—practically via taxes, politically via their symbolic power—
as ideological discourse meriting First Amendment protection.141
If working and having some portion of your pay diverted (via agency
fees) to a state-mandated union is an unlawful violation of free
speech (because, according to Janus, the betrayal of your political
viewpoint outweighs the state’s interest in “peaceful labor relations”
via particular management tactics), then working and having all
of your pay diverted (via a shutdown imposed by management in
the Executive Branch or legislature as part of a political strategy
of negotiation) is a similarly unlawful violation.142 Or maybe it
only seems to be (to a confused governmental employee looking for
cues in Janus to exercise their First Amendment rights). Ordinarily, how a worker might read a First Amendment case wouldn’t
have constitutional bearing, but Janus’s labor peace standard—
which was the controlling standard in Abood—allows this sort of
rhetorical speculation on what workers might do (and how disruptive it might be) to be relevant legal evidence.143 Justice Alito’s
majority opinion made clear that in the Court’s view, there was
simply no evidence beyond speculation that supported the Court’s
reasoning in Abood that exclusive representation and agency fees
were necessary to maintain labor peace.144
While an extreme case, our government shutdown example
illustrates the more fundamental point: the end-game political
consequences of extending free speech rights to labor issues in
government employment contexts is uncertain at best. And, because
the Janus test continues to uphold stable labor relations as a compelling state interest, these political and economic predictions about
governmental management strategy (and the political reaction
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to it) have potential legal consequences for the First Amendment.145
In other words, after Alito opens up the “labor peace” Pandora’s
box by weighing in on what legislative policies (in the Janus case,
agency fees) best allow for labor stability (by claiming that declining union power has not, empirically and as a matter of evidence, created economic “pandemonium”), any policy that could
hypothetically disturb the economic “peace” now has hypothetical
merit that has to be judicially considered. In the next Section, we
see how the traditional critiques of unions could also be implicated,
as legal arguments, in attempts to extend First Amendment
protection to negotiation.
B.Principle Two: Mandatory Collective Bargaining Creates a
Principal-Agent Problem
Mandatory collective bargaining requires a union to act as
the exclusive bargaining agent for an entire class of employees.146 Workers often generally benefit from collective bargaining, both in terms of salary and compensation and employment
benefits.147 The portion of a worker’s salary that goes to pay the
union in the form of agency fees will often be a small percentage
of that benefit.148 If an employee receives a salary increase of
$5000 a year but pays $1000 to the union as an agency fee, can
she really claim to be damaged while netting a benefit of $4000?149
Yet the analysis of whether an individual employee benefits from
union representation is not that simple.
Collective bargaining gained favor and became a bargaining
tactic based on the logic that—by uniting employees through their
trade similarities versus their individual differences—it provided
workers with more power and resulted in those workers receiving more in compensation and better working conditions.150 But,
as with political representation in a two-party system, the interests of a union and its particular (and particularly disaffected)

Id. at 2465.
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employees are often not aligned: the union’s negotiating posture
will necessarily have to favor certain employees at the expense
of others. This—in essence—was Mr. Janus’s complaint, which
he explained in The Chicago Tribune before filing his lawsuit:
I don’t see my union working totally for the good of Illinois
government. For years it supported candidates who put Illinois
into its current budget and pension crisis. Government unions
have pushed for government spending that made the state’s
fiscal situation worse. How is that good for the people of the
state? Or, for that matter, my fellow union members who face
the threat of layoffs or their pension funds someday running
dry? The union voice is not my voice. The union’s fight is not
my fight.151

In his opinion supporting Mr. Janus’s First Amendment
rights to political speech—while still upholding that “labor
peace” was a compelling state interest—Justice Alito concluded
that it was “now clear that Abood’s fears” about instability without collective bargaining were “unfounded.”152 Not only was
there “no pandemonium” in our labor relations since that decision back in 1977 but that “[w]hatever may have been the case
41 years ago when Abood was handed down, it is now undeniable
that ‘labor peace’ can be achieved ‘through means significantly
less restrictive ...’ than the assessment of agency fees.”153 While
Supreme Court decisions typically do not involve the evaluation
of these sorts of policy questions, Janus—by following the longstanding “labor peace” standard (but forgoing deference to the
legislature on it)—opens up a complicated and atypical economic
question for judicial review: what state policies designed to create “labor” and “industrial” stability can warrant violations of
the First Amendment? And what does this “stability” look like in
practice after Janus?
As Justice Kagan foresaw in her Janus dissent, “State and
local government that thought [collective bargaining] provisions
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furthered their interests will need to find new ways of managing
their workforces. Across the country, the relationships of public
employees and employers will alter in both predictable and wholly
unexpected ways.”154 And as the post-Janus Court contemplates
the extension of free speech protections to cover “negotiation” in the
public sector (and thus eliminate collective bargaining), we turn
our rhetorical analysis—ironically—to three traditional critiques
of unions to help clarify (as matters of future management policy
for governmental workers) why they were so preferred by some
legislatures as to be a “compelling” state interest.155 At the heart
of each critique is the “Principle-Agent” problem.
C.Principle Three: Unions Are Less Attractive Options for
Workers than They Once Were
For a variety of reasons, union membership has dropped
over the past several decades.156 Federal and state laws have
improved working conditions and enshrined worker protections
into law.157 Federal minimum wages have risen and many states
have minimum wages that are higher than that mandated by
federal law.158 Employees have more rights and power than they
have historically.159 The nature of work has changed with workers
changing jobs more frequently.160 The plethora of benefits that

Id. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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159 Press Release, Economic Policy Institute, Today’s labor unions give workers the power to improve their jobs and unrig the economy (Aug. 24, 2017),
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have become available from maternity/paternity care, health benefits, tuition reimbursement, retirement accounts, paid time off,
etc. have made it more difficult for negotiators to represent the
interests of large groups of employees.161 As more workers perceive their interests to be different from those the union advocates,
union membership has declined.162
1.Individual Interests of Employees in a Workplace Are—By
Definition—Unreconcilable
The “Principal-Agent” problem that is inherent in any political or economic representation helps us to see the future challenges of the post-Janus world.163 Central to agency law is the
principle that the interests of the principal and the agent must
be aligned.164 Yet some public sector employees and their unions,
necessarily, view the goals of negotiating very differently. For
example, if the union pushes for higher pay for longer-tenured
employees, that may come at the expense of workers who are
more-qualified or higher-performing.165 If the union pushes for
better retirement benefits, that may come at the expense of health
care benefits or higher pay.166 For employees who disagree with
the union’s negotiating posture, forcing them to accept the union’s representation and prohibiting them from negotiating for
themselves creates a principal-agent problem. If an employee
believes she can negotiate a better deal for herself than the union has, should she be allowed to negotiate for herself? To take
the classic example: what if she does not intend to have children,
so maternity benefits are worthless to her. Should she permitted
to try to negotiate a deal for herself that removes that benefit, to
the extent allowable by law, and replaces it with increased compensation, vacation, or some other benefit?

FRANK BURCHILL, LABOUR RELATIONS 83 (4th ed. 2014).
See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S.
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accompanying text (2019).
164 Pinar Akman, Online Platforms, Agency, and Competition Law: Mind the
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161
162

638 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:609
For employees in this situation—like Mr. Janus—the appeal
of making your personal economic negotiations part of protected
First Amendment speech are obvious.167 That said, the principleagent problem is actually one of the reasons why Congress (and
many states) prefer to use collective bargaining in the management
of labor, and why it was constitutionally protected as a compelling state interest.
Unions, as representative bodies, are not neutral but instead
controlled by one group of employees.168 The common critique of
unions is that mandatory representation is irreconcilable with
the fair treatment of at least some and often a substantial number of employees.169 Additionally, as is typically reasoned, “ ...
conflicts created by individuals’ need for fair treatment at the
hands of their union could be greatly reduced if exclusivity were
abandoned and employees were allowed to be represented by their
own individually chosen agents.”170 We agree. But the stated
governmental interests in Janus, Abood, and the preceding
agency fee cases all presumed both of these points.171 While representative forms of government are always unfair to particular
individuals, from a management perspective Congress and state
legislatures preferred dealing with one actor representing their
labor force versus a phalanx of individualized and competing
claims.172 Extending Janus free speech protections may, indeed,
empower individual rights. But it also—necessarily—moves the
burden of managing “conflicts created by individuals’ need for
fair treatment” from unions to (similarly taxpayer funded) governmental managers.173 Whether this empowerment of workers
is desirable or not is an open question. But it certainly seems to
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trigger Janus’s standard for evaluating the effects of “internal”
labor peace in a workplace.
2.The Changing Nature of the Workforce Makes Union
Membership Less Attractive
An oddity of unionization is that once a workplace votes to
unionize, the union becomes the exclusive representative for the
employees in perpetuity.174 In some states, the unionizing elections occurred so long ago that no current employees voted for
the union that represents them.175 And yet, the nature of the
workforce has also changed substantially since the dawn of collective bargaining. While it once was not unusual for a worker to
spend his entire career with one company, that is far less common today.176 In January of 2016, the Bureau of Labor Statistics
found that the median number of years a worker had been with
his current employer was 4.2 years, down from 4.6 years just two
years prior in January of 2014.177 According to the Future Workplace “Multiple Generations @ Work” survey of 1,189 employers
and 150 managers, 91 percent of millennials expect to stay in a
job less than three years.178 That means those workers would
have 15–20 jobs over the course of their working lives.179
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An employee with the expectation that she will only work at
the company for a few years obviously has different compensation
interests than someone who expects to be employed there for his
entire career. The union representatives cannot zealously represent both groups, which have very different economic interests
in that negotiation.180 Moreover, the very concept of the “labor
peace” standard has its roots in the notion—accepted by the
Courts in Abood—that the “principle of exclusive union representation ... is a central element in the congressional structuring
of industrial relations.”181 In 2020, “industrial relations” hardly
seems like the economic ecosystem in which we live and work.182
The challenges of the twenty-first century gig economy—
and the new labor force’s beliefs about what constitutes a living
wage, fair work-life balance, and protections against discrimination
in the workplace—are the economic policy issues that will determine the next American century.183 How extending First Amendment protections to the negotiations of governmental employees
would affect this question is uncertain. However—again, ironically—Marxist labor theory offers one prediction: the opening up
of unions—across workplaces—to organize employees and independent contractors of similar trades.184 If compulsory collective

See Adrienne L. Saldaña, Conflicting Interests in Union Representation:
Should Exclusivity be Abolished?, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 133, 133 (1992).
181 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977).
182 Id.
183 Vice Chair’s Staff of the Joint Economic Committee and Amy Klobuchar,
The Economic Consequences of Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation
and Gender Identity, U.S. CONG. JOINT ECON. COMM., at 2–3 (Nov. 2013), https://
www.jec.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/42dc59a0-6071-46d0-8ff2-9bd7a6b0077
f/enda---final-11.5.13.pdf [https://perma.cc/UF5S-D9HJ]; see Aspen Institute
Staff, Better Work-Life Balance Doesn’t Just Help Employees; It Helps the Whole
Economy, THE ASPEN INST. (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.aspeninstitute.org
/videos/better-work-life-balance-doesnt-just-help-employees-it-helps-the-whole
-economy/ [https://perma.cc/ZNG9-SESM]; John Frazer, How the Gig Economy
is Reshaping Careers for the Next Generation, FORBES (Feb. 15, 2019), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/johnfrazer1/2019/02/15/how-the-gig-economy-is-reshap
ing-careers-for-the-next-generation/#4bb321ab49ad [https://perma.cc/UQW8
-5FKK]; Eric Ravenscraft, What a ‘Living Wage’ Actually Means, N.Y. TIMES
(June 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/05/smarter-living/what-a-liv
ing-wage-actually-means.html [https://perma.cc/MP68-96NF].
184 See George Fishman, Capitalist Development and Class Capacities: Marxist
Theory and Union Organization, 15 LAB. STUD. J. 101, 101 (1990) (book review).
180

2020]

JANUS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

641

bargaining is ultimately found to be unconstitutional, one solution is to permit employees the choice to form and join unions
which collectively bargain or negotiate directly with their employers, as they do in the private sector. The likely outcome is
that workers with aligned interests may choose to collectively
bargain, while others will choose to negotiate for themselves. A
typical workforce will be comprised of a number of unions representing different constituencies and their interests, as well as a
few employees who choose not to join any union and to go it alone.
Such an arrangement will provide employees with the right to
choose whether or not to bargain collectively. But it will also
lead to precisely the instabilities in labor relations that Abood
warned of: “‘inter-union rivalries’ [that] would foster ‘dissension
within the work force’”; employers facing “‘conflicting demands
from different unions’”; “‘confusion’” as employers attempt to “‘enforce two or more agreements specifying different terms and
conditions of employment’”; and unions under attack from “‘rival
labor organization[s].’”185
3.Grievance Procedures Are Bureaucratic and Slow Moving
Whether and how employees will be afforded due process
in the workplace is also subject to mandatory collective bargaining.186 Placing a union in the role of exclusive bargaining agent
affects how employee rights are defined, the types of employer
behavior subject to the grievance process, and when, how, and
whether the union will choose to assist an employee with a grievance. This arrangement obviously benefits some employees to
the detriment of others as workers are often:
... substantially boxed in between two massive institutions.
On one side is a large corporation with employees numbering
in the hundreds of thousands. On the other, a labor organization
with a million members and an inevitably formidable organizational structure of officialdom and appeals. Relations between
the two are governed by collective ‘agreements’ running into
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the hundreds of pages, looking more like complex statutory
enactments than contracts, and containing a quasi-judicial
enforcement machinery, access to which is denied the employee
when the bargaining representative declines to act.187

It is not difficult to imagine a case where older, female, disabled, or
minority employees may be more concerned about how issues related to sexual harassment or workplace discrimination are dealt
with in a grievance process than other workers. Those employees
may understandably believe they have different interests than
other employees, which the union as the sole bargaining agent
does not do enough to protect. Unions have a duty of fair representation, but the tension between some employees and the union
raises questions about how hard the union will fight for a grievance it doesn’t believe in or support, or which the union may
even view as contrary to its own interests.188 The result—as is
often the case in representative politics—is a tyranny of the majority, where a simple majority of those who vote within a workplace can certify a union, which is then the exclusive bargaining
agent on behalf of that workforce.189
As our new economic paradigms create unprecedented
challenges—and reconfigurations of what it means to be a fairly
treated and compensated worker in the global economy—these
issues must be carefully addressed. That said, the pre-Janus
court was careful to reject “all attempts” at making a “federal
constitutional issue out of basic ‘employment matters, including
working conditions, pay, discipline, promotion, leave, vacations,
and terminations.’”190 Janus—by collapsing the distinction between workplace and public issues—sets up a potentially unprecedented (and costly and possibly destabilizing) number of
legal, economic, and management issues for government officials
(versus union officials) to handle regarding workplace claims of
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discrimination on the basis of race, religion, gender, sexuality,
and ability.191
IV.JANUS IS ALREADY AFFECTING ORGANIZATIONS THAT
COMPEL MEMBERSHIP OR PARTICIPATION
The Janus decision will also hit close to home for many attorneys, affecting the operations of state mandatory bar associations. In the case of Fleck v. Wetch, attorney Arnold Fleck filed suit
in 2015 to challenge a law that requires North Dakota attorneys to
not only pass the state’s bar exam, but also to join the state bar
association and pay member dues, a portion of which support political activities.192 Fleck had volunteered time and money to support
a ballot measure to “establish a presumption that each parent is entitled to equal parental rights.”193 Fleck discovered that the North
Dakota State Bar Association was using his compulsory fees to oppose that same ballot measure.194 The Supreme Court had established minimum safeguards to prevent this sort of forced subsidy of
political or ideological activities.195 Fleck filed suit, claiming his
First Amendment rights were being violated.196 The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a state bar association was permitted to
charge dues to non-members as “a means of providing regulation in,
and oversight of, the legal profession.”197 The U.S. Supreme Court
disagreed and vacated that decision, remanding it to the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of
Janus.198 A similar lawsuit to Fleck is now pending in federal court
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in Oregon.199 Other lawsuits have also been filed in Oklahoma,
Wisconsin, and Texas.200
The Fleck case provides a preview of how the effects of
Janus will go well beyond public unions and affect all manner of
other professional organizations.201 In any organization where 1)
members are forced to join, pay dues, contribute money, or in
any way support the organization and 2) the organization participates in any form of political activity, Janus will force some
serious changes.202 Those organizations will need to figure out a
way to create a sort of firewall between any degree of compulsion,
whether to join, pay money, or participate in activities and any
type of activity that could arguably implicate the First Amendment rights of dissenting members. It seems clear that the U.S.
Supreme Court will be closely scrutinizing those relationships
and looking for anything that looks like compelled speech.203 By
focusing on how bar associations may respond to Janus, we can
see some pragmatic paths forward for organizations that could
illuminate solutions for public-sector unions and the future of
labor negotiations for government employees.
There is a wide division on a state-to-state basis as to how
bar associations are organized.204 The solution for bar associations may be as simple as dividing the traditional role of the state
bar association into mandatory and voluntary functions. The
Nebraska State Bar Association has adopted that sort of hybrid
structure.205 Members are required to pay a basic membership
fee, currently $98.00, in order to practice law. Those fees are used
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to support the administration and enforcement of the regulation
of the practice of law by the Court.206 Members may also choose to
pay additional voluntary dues “to analyze and disseminate to its
members information on proposed or pending legislative proposals
and any other nonregulatory activity intended to improve the
quality of legal services to the public and promote the purposes of
the Association.”207 This arrangement is intended to avoid requiring
attorneys to support political activities they may disagree with as a
condition of practicing law.208 In light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
treatment of the Fleck appeal, any remaining state bar associations
who have not organized themselves this way, separating mandatory
membership from political activities, may be forced to do so.209
It is possible, but far less likely, that Janus could also affect
private unions. Courts have routinely recognized the sovereign-like
power of unions.210 “Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining
representative with powers comparable to those possessed by a
legislative body both to create and restrict the rights of those whom
it represents....”211 This was not a new concept. In analyzing a previous case where minority employees felt they lacked fair representation, then Supreme Court Chief Justice Harlan Stone wrote:
[f]or the representative is clothed with power not unlike that
of a legislature which is subject to constitutional limitations on
its power to deny, restrict, destroy or discriminate against the
rights of those for whom it legislates and which is also under an
affirmative constitutional duty equally to protect those rights.212

With these inherent powers authorized by the National
Labor Relations Act, unions control the destiny of their employees,
in similar fashion to the authority granted to state and federal legislatures to control the destinies of the citizens it represents.213 By
contracting with employers to force membership dues or agency
fees on employees as a condition of employment, the union (as
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sovereign authority) is essentially taxing its employees for public services.214 If an employee wishes to not be bound to union
membership or its taxation, the employee must move to a state
where unions have less legislative authority, much like a citizen
must move to a different state if he or she does not want to be
bound to the laws of his or her land. If those organizations then
participate in political activity, that could implicate the First
Amendment rights of members who disagree with the positions
taken by the union.215 As the case for private unions being state
actors and thus implicating the First Amendment is a difficult
one to make, the focus of this Article is on public unions.
Post-Janus, courts will be placing increasing scrutiny on
bar associations and other similar organizations to ensure that
mandatory dues are not being used for anything that could conceivably be considered a political activity.216 This raises some
interesting and problematic questions. Are there positions on
issues that are so closely related to the functioning of an organization that the organization should be permitted to advocate for
those positions? For example, families with children have been
recently crossing into the United States from Mexico to seek
asylum.217 Some of those children are not being provided with
counsel during court hearings related to their claims for asylum
or immigration status generally.218 If a state bar association in a
border state wants to take the position that the government
should ensure those children are provided with counsel to protect
their interests, is that permitted under Janus? Would the bar
association be advocating for due process, right to counsel, and
other fundamental legal rights, or would they be seen to be wading into a political issue? If members of that bar association opposed to illegal immigration, objecting to their mandatory dues
being used to support a position they disagree with, how would
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the U.S. Supreme Court view that dispute? There are countless
conceivable examples where arguments can be made on one side
that the position is important or consequential (if not essential)
to the goals, values, etc. of the profession itself, while an equally
persuasive argument can be raised on the other side that the
dispute is political in nature and mandatory dues should not be
spent taking sides on the issue.
Another option is for membership in state bar associations to be completely voluntary. Many bar associations in states
such as New York operate this way, essentially as trade organizations.219 Making membership and the paying of dues completely voluntary eliminates the tension between compulsory
dues being paid to the organization and the organization engaging in political advocacy that some members may object to.220
But then the question becomes—as it was with Janus—can a
bar association (or our contemporary understanding of law as a
profession)—survive, existentially, without compulsory fees? To
comply with Janus, bar associations and other trade organizations may have to find a way to divorce any degree of compulsion
to join or contribute to the organization from any political or
ideological advocacy the group may engage in.221
Many of the principles implicated in these lawsuits involving attorneys who do not want to join or contribute to their
state bar associations are the same as when public employees
like Mr. Janus have no wish to be a member of or pay fees to a
union.222 If an individual is compelled to join or pay fees to an
organization and thus subsidize speech she disagrees with, the
Court in Janus made clear that is a First Amendment violation.223 An individual has a basic constitutional right to speak on
or remain silent about an issue.224 Forcing a person to endorse a
position he disagrees with is just as much a violation as preventing him from voicing his views on an issue.225 Just as agency
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fees represent compelled speech, so, by its very nature, does
compulsory collective bargaining.226
Unions and trade organizations should also see the writing on the wall and realize that compulsory collective bargaining
is under threat. They should find ways to more effectively represent the interests of the workers they represent. One option
would be to let workers express their employment interests and
then divide them into smaller bargaining units based on those.
Younger employees who value increased salary over retirement
benefits could be represented by a union employee who pushes
for higher pay, while older employees could choose to push instead for more generous pensions, better health care, etc. Such
an arrangement would better align the interests of the workers
and their union representatives and at least reduce the principle-agent problem. As the Supreme Court continues to make
clear that compulsory collective bargaining is compelled speech,
the perceived gap between what workers want and what those
purporting to represent them focus on in negotiating is going to
be critical. To the extent that unions can reduce that gap, by
providing more effective representation, they may be able to stay out
of the Court’s crosshairs.
CONCLUSION
If an employee is required as a condition of employment to
accept a deal he may not approve of and which is negotiated by person(s) he has not chosen or elected, then the Janus decision recognized that this arrangement substantially restricts that employee’s
rights.227 Unions and trade associations that participate in collective bargaining should be working to increase the engagement
of, the choices made available to, and the percentage of the organization’s business that is voted on by the group’s members.
Unions and other professional organizations will need to
figure out ways to create a sort of Chinese wall between any
degree of compulsion, whether to join, pay money, or participate
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in activities and any type of activity that could arguably implicate the First Amendment rights of dissenting members. Those
organizations will likewise need to find ways to make the processes of choosing representatives and enacting policies more
representative. Only by implementing these types of measures
will unions and other trade organizations be able to withstand
the heightened scrutiny they will increasingly face.

